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Abstract
Proto/Amorphous Cooperative Energy Management (PACEM) aims to build and
deploy a highly scalable system for smart power grids that will enable efficient de-
mand shaping for small-user networks. Two key problems are to provide distributed
control algorithm for efficient demand shaping and to provide an incentive structure
to encourage both users and the electric power sector to opt-in to PACEM. In this
thesis, I address the first problem by designing ColoredPower, a probabilistic con-
trol algorithm. I implemented and tested ColoredPower in MIT Proto, building on
previous work in spatial computing. Simulations in Proto show that ColoredPower
operates within 3% error and provides a stable dynamic response time on the order
of minutes. To address the second problem, I provide a model for user and power
company incentives in PACEM, in the form of the Colored Procurement Mechanism,
which enables further work in optimal algorithmic mechanism design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Until recently, growth in electricity demand in urban areas has been met with growth
in power generation. This is not always a feasible solution—building new power plants
is expensive and sometimes harmful to the environment. Power generation varies over
time, depending on factors like the cost of fuel and the prediction of demand. For
newer technologies like solar and wind plants, the power generated changes with the
time of day and the weather. The variable demand for electricity means that the
power available must always meet the highest possible demand. Instead of simply
increasing power generation to meet increasing demand, we could ask people to use
less electricity. This is called demand side energy management. Simply put, when the
demand or “load” on a power grid goes too high, people could turn off unnecessary
devices. If a large number of people reduce their electricity consumption by a small
amount, there would be no need to generate more costly power.
This type of demand side management, done manually, exists for large-scale energy
users e.g. large businesses, manufacturing plants, etc. Small-scale demand manage-
ment is challenging; individual user consumption is small, yet the total consumption
of small-scale consumers is a significant part of the total energy used. My project
delivers results toward solving the problem of managing small-scale demand.
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1.1 Proto/Amorphous Cooperative Energy Man-
agement (PACEM)
Suppose a city power grid is experiencing a heavy load in the middle of the day, and
the city needs to reduce power consumption in the city by about 10% in order to
function properly. One way to do this is for the power company to cut off power for
an arbitrary neighborhood in the city.
What if the power company could instead send out a request saying that the
total power consumption needs to be cut by 10%, so it would be great if a few of
the non-critical electrical appliances around the city were shut off? By shutting off
a few air conditioners, washing machines or other household appliances around the
city, the power consumption could easily be brought down, no one would experience
a blackout, and for all practical purposes, no real functionality of the city would be
lost.
In 2009, residential electricity use accounted for about 35% of the total electricity
used in the United States[3]. This is an area of energy use which is usually flexible.
Most people may be willing to turn off their front porch light for a couple of hours
if it helps the environment. They might also be willing to do their laundry at 9pm
instead of 8pm, especially if it means that they get a discount on their electricity bill
in exchange. The problem is that no number of call centers can handle these sort of
negotiations and control to communicate constantly with every residence, and no one
wants to be bothered by a stream of phone calls and run around the house turning
devices on and off.
Proto/Amorphous Cooperative Energy Management (PACEM)[7] aims to provide
a completely automated solution to this problem. Imagine electrical devices on the
power grid being able to communicate among themselves. The power company sends
out a request to cut the energy consumption by some amount, and the devices ne-
gotiate and decide which of them will shut off, for how long, and at what cost. This
is done taking into account how critical each device is (the computer might be more
important than the laundry machine), and doing so in a way that is “fair” to everyone
16
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Figure 1-1: From the PACEM whitepaper[7]: utilities supply power and request
decreases in demand. Customers specify their flexibility in exchange for lower energy
prices. In each home, smart appliances and outlets communicate to decide which
devices will provide this demand reduction. A network of smart meters manages the
overall demand while an internal wireless mesh network in every home manages the
internal demand in a way that is distributed fairly.
(devices which are equally critical are given equal treatment), all in a fraction of the
time that it would take for the utility to manually call and negotiate with users. A
fully developed PACEM would be able to do all of these things.
1.2 Obstacles to PACEM
I address two key obstacles to realizing PACEM. The first is to design a distributed
control algorithm to run on these devices that satisfies a set of well-defined re-
quirements, which translate into real world practicality. This is a problem in the
realm of spatial computing[1, 21]. I will demonstrate the feasibility of this algorithm,
ColoredPower, with an implementation in MIT Proto and a comprehensive set of
simulations. The second obstacle is to ensure that both end-users and companies in
the electric power sector will want to adopt PACEM. This is a problem in the realm
of algorithmic mechanism design, where we are trying to build an incentive structure
to motivate participation in PACEM. I will give a brief explanation of how PACEM
17
can fit into the electric power sector, and some economic models of PACEM that we
can use to design optimal incentives.
1.3 Previous Work
1.3.1 Spatial Computing and Proto
A spatial computer is a network of devices distributed through space such that the
ability of devices to communicate depends strongly on their proximity[6]. Spatial
computing can work using an amorphous medium abstraction - i.e. the network of
devices is an approximation of an amorphous computational space with a computer
at every point in this space. MIT Proto is a high level programming language where
programs rely on referencing continuous regions of space and time rather than indi-
vidual devices. The main advantage in context of PACEM is that the amorphous
medium abstraction makes algorithms in spatial computing highly scalable[2]. De-
vices can be added or dropped from the network, and each device only needs to be
able to communicate with a few devices around it in order for the system to work.
Further, the proximity-based nature of communication means that no device has ac-
cess to specific information about a large number of other devices. This is important
for privacy concerns, as well as the ability to enforce economic fairness (i.e. no device
should be able to “cheat the system” and profit by lying about their preferences or
collaborating with a small number of other devices).
A fundamental area of study in distributed computing is distributed consensus
- ColoredPower depends on the existence of a consensus algorithm that can report
estimates about different aggregates in the network of electrical devices, even on a
very large network with frequent communication and device errors. Because demand
from residence to residence may be quite different, we cannot develop estimates based
on sampling, but have to incorporate every single device in the aggregation. While
designing ColoredPower, I will stick to a simple consensus algorithm, however, this
can be substituted with more sophisticated existing algorithms e.g.[17, 18, 14].
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1.3.2 Utility and User Incentives
In economics, the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design[8] tackles problems mainly
involving “resource allocation” - when the demand for a certain resource does not meet
the supply, and every participant in the market is strategically selfish and has different
preferences, we need to design a mechanism to ensure that the resource allocator
achieves certain goals (e.g. maximum social welfare, maximum profit, etc) There
are many different ways to model PACEM in order to design an optimal economic
mechanism depending on the economic goals we set for the system. We will try to
design applications of existing theoretical approaches in these areas.
1.3.3 Large Scale Demand Response
Manual demand response systems already exist for large energy users. For example,
the Xcel Energy-EnerNOC Peak Savings Program[12] in Colorado works with users
(usually businesses) that can offer more than 100kW in flexibility (which is large com-
pared to residential power consumption of 1-5kW). This program keeps the flexible
demand at these businesses “on call” during the day, and calls the business with an
hour notice to request that they cut their power use for 2-4 hours. Businesses are
allowed to override cut-requests from EnerNOC if they wish at no penalty. A com-
pany called Consumer PowerLine has made progress in providing demand response
in urban multiple-family buildings; it builds electricity pools from clients to create a
virtual power plant that can be activated with a half-hour notice[19].
In the long term, PACEM would also aim to automate this type of demand re-
sponse. Currently, PACEM focuses on small-scale residential users. A neighborhood
of about 100 residences consuming 5kW of power with about 20% demand flexibility,
can provide the same total flexibility(100kW) as a large energy user. This flexibility
will usually be more fine-grained than that of a large energy user as well, since a
manufacturing plant may only have a single high-consumption device, while there are
many small-consumption devices in a residential area.
Another concept in controlling demand is dynamic energy pricing[9]. This means
19
that instead of paying a flat rate for electricity (which may change every month or
so) users can pay the going market price for electricity whenever they use it. The
normalized flat rate means that sometimes, low energy users effectively subsidize high
energy users. By charging the going market rate, the rise in peak energy prices can by
propagated directly to the user. If a homeowner can see that she is paying a higher
price for doing laundry at 8pm than doing it at 9pm, she may choose to do it at
9pm. PACEM is open to the use of any pricing model; both ColoredPower as well as
the user incentives described in this thesis can operate with either static or dynamic
pricing.
1.3.4 Smart Grids and Metering
PACEM relies on smart power metering and smart grid technology, where the core
electric power grid is overlaid with intelligent devices that can communicate and do
some processing. An example of technology that would enable PACEM is a smart
outlet that has the ability to record user preferences and communicate wirelessly
within a small home network, such as those shown in Figure 1-2. It would be easy to
adapt the design of existing smart outlets such as the Kill-a-Watt or Watt-Minder in
order to create outlets that are compatible with PACEM. Another example of smart
outlets is in the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) Edge project. Using Carrier
Comfort Choice thermostats coupled with two-way pager communication, it allows
customers to control their thermostats via the Internet[5].
1.4 Outline
Chapter 2 characterizes the computational requirements for the ColoredPower algo-
rithm and provides a description of the actual algorithm. Chapter 3 describes the
experimental verification methods and the simulations run in MIT Proto, making con-
clusions about the advantages and limitations of the performance of ColoredPower
under different conditions. The first part of Chapter 4 gives a survey of the electric
power sector and economic motivations for the power sector to adopt PACEM. The
20
(a) PACEM Smart Outlet (b) Kill-a-Watt (c) Watt-
Minder
Figure 1-2: From the PACEM whitepaper[7]: A “smart outlet” adapter to plug over
an existing outlet (a). The “Not now!” button allows an override, otherwise a three-
way switch allows the user to set the importance of the particular device operating on
the outlet. The outlet displays its mode with a multi-color LED, and communicates
wirelessly with other outlets, appliances, and its meter box. This would be a small
upgrade on existing technologies like the Kill-a-Watt (b) and Watt-Minder (c).
second part of Chapter 4 dives into algorithmic mechanism design for user incentives
in PACEM. Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of this project and outlines areas
for further study.
21
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Chapter 2
The ColoredPower Algorithm
Designing an algorithm to effectively control all the devices on the PACEM network
is challenging. It must be quick, fair, and any single device should only turn on or off
occasionally. We have developed the ColoredPower algorithm as a controller for the
PACEM system, addressing these challenges using randomized local actions. When
the action distribution is adjusted to compensate for currently uncontrollable appli-
ances, standard feedback controllers can be used to produce local actions that combine
to create the desired global effect. In this chapter, I first give an overview of the re-
quirements that ColoredPower aims to meet. Then I describe the ColoredPower
algorithm in detail along with an analysis. I will construct the algorithm in steps,
starting with the algorithm for a simple system and building up to ColoredPower.
2.1 Algorithm Requirements
The algorithm that we need to control the distributed network of electrical devices
must satisfy the following requirements:
1. Demand Flexibility: At any given point in time, the demand for power should
have as much flexibility as possible—either to shut down devices that are cur-
rently on, or to relax and turn on devices that were shut down for demand
response.
23
2. Dynamic Response: The algorithm must be able to control the global power
consumption, Qm such that it tracks a changing global target Qt quickly and
reliably. For the current electrical grid, this means a significant response on the
order of minutes. Figure 2-2 gives an idea of how fast the algorithm needs to
be with regard to the different functions of the electric power sector.
3. Fairness: Because PACEM depends on weakly incentivized participation (see
chapter 4), we do not want users of the system to percieve it as unfair, or else
they may stop participating. For example, a user may get upset if his air con-
ditioner gets shut off more than his neighbor’s. To satisfy this, we require that
over a sufficiently long period of time, the expected total power consumption
by two identical devices should be the same. At any time, if two devices have
the same state, they should have an equal chance of deviating from that state.
4. Privacy: Fine-grained power consumption data is a significant privacy concern,
so the data about different users and their devices should remain private. We
thus require that global computations operate on many-consumer aggregates
(which are by nature anonymized), and that no single device should ever have
information about a large number of other individual devices.
5. Scalability: The algorithm must be scalable to very large numbers of devices.
For instance, a large city grid might have tens of millions of devices.
6. Non-intrusiveness: The devices running the algorithm should only switch on or
off occasionally. A user should always be able to “override” the system on a
particular device at any time.
2.2 The ColoredPower Algorithm
Classical control theory provides many ways to track a target value using feedback
systems of various types. The problem we are trying to tackle is of the same nature;
we need to track the total supplied power i.e. the global target, Qt. We want our
24
Figure 2-1: Under PACEM, consumers “color” their power demand indicating when
it may be controlled. The algorithm tries to reduce the global measured power con-
sumption Qm from the global total demand Qd to the global target Qt.
Figure 2-2: Time scale of different control decisions in the power system. PACEM
operates on the economic dispatch of generated power.
25
global power consumption, Qm to follow the global target as closely as possible. The
total supplied power has many different factors that go into how it changes over
time, including economics of the power companies supplying the power, the capacities
and overhead of the generators producing the power, government regulations, and of
course the global demand for power (called Qd).
The ColoredPower algorithm is designed to fulfill the requirements described in
the previous section via distributed probabilistic control. The three main advantages
of using a distributed probabilistic approach are speed, robustness, and privacy. The
basic idea behind this approach is that instead of trying to aggregate fine-grained
data to a central point, all devices share a model of the aggregate system state.
When the target consumption Qt changes, each device independently calculates what
percentage of devices should change state overall, and then flips a weighted coin to
determine whether it is one of those devices. Although random variance and consumer
heterogeneity make it unlikely that this will immediately succeed, it will quickly take
consumption much closer to the target. When coupled with a feedback controller,
the consumption can be fine tuned to arrive at the target. The law of large numbers
plays to our advantage since the more consumers that participate in the system,
the better that probabilistic control is expected to perform. The decentralization of
control provides robustness, since there need not be any critical points in the network
where a small number of failing devices can cripple the system. Since the control is
local, data can be aggressively aggregated to preserve privacy. The following sections
describe the incremental construction of ColoredPower.
2.3 Building up to ColoredPower
Let us begin by defining the base information that we assume is available for the net-
work of devices. For now, we will ignore power coloring and consider all consumption
to be in a single category. Each device i holds the following state information:
• n, the total number of devices on the network
26
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Figure 2-3: From the PACEM whitepaper[7]: The “ColoredPower” algorithm esti-
mates flexibility information from the network via an aggregator tree. The utility then
sets a target color range. Each consumer’s household randomly chooses a color, shut-
ting off any appliances more flexible than its chosen color. Under the ColoredPower
algorithm, The gateway device for each household selects a priority level for all ap-
pliances in the household, and any appliances beyond that priority shut themselves
down (subject to customer override).
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• Qt, the current global target (i.e. total supplied power)
• Qm, the total measured power consumption on the network (which we wish to
control to equal Qt)
• Qd, the total power demand from all the devices on the network
• di, the device’s own measured power demand
• mi, the device’s own measured power consumption (we assume it to be 0 when
off and di when on)
• tflip The time remaining until the device is next allowed to flip a coin to decide
whether to change state
Each device is also assumed to have a clock that measures elapsed time with no more
than a small error, and to evaluate its algorithm frequently. Whenever tflip reaches
zero, a device will execute its probabilistic control step, then reset tflip to an expected
value of Tflip (section 2.3.2 describes how Tflip is chosen).
We assume that the global state (n, Qt, Qm, and Qd) is provided by a distributed
aggregation algorithm with some lag. This lag cannot be less than Ω(diameter/c),
where diameter is the number of hops across the network and c is the maximum speed
of information flow per hop. In the ColoredPower implementation for this thesis, we
aggregate using a distance-based spanning tree (as shown in Figure 2-3). We chose
this aggregator for simplicity and its Θ(diameter/c) lag. We expect that a much
more robust aggregator is both possible and necessary for a real deployment.
2.3.1 Simple Local Probabilistic Control
The simplest probabilistic control for Qm to track Qt is to have device i flip a coin
with probability psimple =
Qt
Qd
of turning heads. If the coin falls heads, the device
chooses to turn on and consume di power, if not, it chooses to turn off and consume
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Figure 2-4: The simplest block of local probabilistic control in order to achieve the
desired global result in the expected case.
0 power. If each device does this the total consumption will be
E[mi] = psimple × di (2.1)
=
Qt
Qd
× di (2.2)
E[Qm] = E[
∑
i
mi] (2.3)
=
∑
i
E[mi] (2.4)
E[Qm] =
∑
i
Qt
Qd
× di (2.5)
=
Qt
Qd
∑
i
di (2.6)
=
Qt
Qd
×Qd (2.7)
= Qt (2.8)
For example, consider 100 devices, each consuming 1 unit of energy (thus the global
demand is 100), and the global target is 70. If each device turns on with 70% proba-
bility then our expected global power consumption is equal to the global target.
There are two major problems with this design:
1. From iteration to iteration of the local control, there is nothing that prevents
an individual electrical device from switching on and off very rapidly; this is
not an acceptable solution because the rapid oscillation of a single device is
undesirable.
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2. The simple probabilistic control does not account for the variance that comes
with randomization. It is unlikely that the global consumption actually hits ex-
actly Qt. Since we are summing n independent identically distributed random
variables (because the probability is the same for all the devices), the mean of
the sum will be the sum of the means, but and the standard deviation of the sum
will be the norm of the individual standard deviations. Thus the global con-
sumption will likely be somewhere in [Qt−
√
n ∗ p(1− p), Qt +
√
n ∗ p(1− p)].
2.3.2 Timed Local Probabilistic Control
To address the first problem we add timers to every device which ensure that once
a device turns on or off, it stays that way for a period of time. So we introduce the
following new parameters for each device.
• tfall: the time remaining until the device is allowed to decrease its power con-
sumption m
• trise: the time remaining until the device is allowed to increase its power con-
sumption m
Every time a device increases power consumption, tfall gets reset to an expected value
of Tfall. Similarly, if a device decreases consumption trise gets reset to an expected
value of Trise. Devices that have recently changed state are thus “timed out” and
cannot change state again in the opposite direction soon.
When a timer tx is reset to an expected value of TX , it is important that there be
a large amount of variance in the value it is reset to. This effectively desynchronizes
devices from one another, ensuring that in the expected case, there are always some
devices that are allowed to change their state, and therefore some demand flexibility.
Therefore, at each reset of a timer tx, its new value is selected from a uniform random
distribution on the interval [Tx
2
, 3×Tx
2
].
With the addition of these timers, our prior simple probabalistic control will no
longer operate correctly, since timed-out devices are capable of changing state. In
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Figure 2-5: Division of devices into three categories based on their fall, rise, and flip
timers. If a device is unable to move down, it is 1-fixed, and if it is unable to move
up, it is 0-fixed. If it is neither, then it is flippable.
our example, the demand is 100, the target has recently switched from 100 to 70.
We would like our local probabilistic control to give us an expected global power
consumption of 70. Consider this situation, except 50 devices are timed out and
50 are available for a decrease in power consumption. The probability with which
each non-timed-out device decides whether to stay on or turn off is still psimple =
70
100
= 0.7. Then the expected global power consumption at the next step becomes∑
i∈timed out di + psimple ×
∑
i∈not timed out di = 50 + 35 = 85, rather than 70 as desired.
We thus need to adjust psimple in some way that will depend on the number of
devices that are not-timed-out, in order to maintain the accuracy of our expected
global power consumption. To do this we aggregate new global state information
about the state of the network. Each device is classified into exactly one of three
states (Figure 2-5):
• 1-fixed devices: The number of devices unable to fall at that instant (i.e. re-
cently turned on). The total demand for these devices is denoted by Q1
• 0-fixed devices: The number of devices unable to rise at that instant (i.e. re-
cently turned off). The total demand for these is denoted by Q0
• flippable devices: The rest, i.e. the number of devices that are available for
local probabilistic control. The total demand for these is denoted by Qf , and
is a measure of the demand flexibility of the system.
The 1-fixed and 0-fixed terminology comes from the status of the devices as on (1)
or off (0). These values will be collected by global aggregation along with the other
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aggregate values.Note that by definition,
1 fixed+ 0 fixed+ flippable = n
and similarly,
Q1 +Q0 +Qf = Qd
As opposed to the Simple Local Probabilistic Control, where the demand flexibility
is Qd, the demand flexibility is now Qf , reflecting the fact that the control itself
impinges on flexibility. Further, Q1 demand is already fixed as on, which means that
Q1 power is already being consumed regardless of the control at that moment. In
order for the expected consumption to be psimple ∗ Qd, the devices can modify the
local probabilistic control as follows:
pcensus =
psimple ∗Qd −Q1
Qf
Each device that is not timed out flips a coin with probability pcensus. If the coin falls
heads, the device turns on and consumes di power; if not, it turns off and consume
0 power. It is easy to see that if Qf = Qd, i.e. all devices are flippable, then
pcensus = psimple. Note also that if there is not enough demand flexibility to achieve
the target, pcensus will be outside of [0, 1]. In this case, we clip it to [0, 1] to get as
close as possible to the target.
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Figure 2-6: Census adjusted probabilistic control
In general, we have
E[mi∈flippable] = pcensus × di (2.9)
E[mi∈(0,1)fixed] = di, 0 (2.10)
E[Qm] = E[
∑
i
mi] (2.11)
= Q1 +
∑
i∈flippable
E[mi] (2.12)
= Q1 +
∑
i∈flippable
pcensus × di (2.13)
= Q1 + pcensus ×Qf (2.14)
= Qt (2.15)
This timer dependent and census-adjusted local probabilistic control gives us the
desired expected global power consumption, while neatly allowing each device to be
switched between on and off at a non-intrusively low frequency.
2.3.3 Timed Local Probabilistic Feedback Control
We still need to address the problem of variance. We will do this with feedback control
based on the global consumption Qm. We have chosen to use a simple PID controller.
This long-established generic controller, which incorporates a (P)roportional term
to address instantaneous error, an (I)ntegral term to address accumulating “past”
error, and a (D)erivative term to to predict likely “future” error, is a simple and well-
understood starting point for adding feedback control to a system (though we shall
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see in Section 3.4 that a more sophisticated controller will eventually be needed). I
will take a moment here to give more detailed justification for the use of a full PID
controller. The distributed consensus algorithm only delivers estimates that get more
accurate over time. This means that the values of Qm, Qd, Qf etc. may not always
be accurate; in fact, if the target has recently changed, the correct reporting of these
values to the different devices will lag behind the actual network state. We take the
maximum possible lag in the network and call this the feedback delay. Integral error
feedback is a good way to control for delays in measurement. We can use standard
tricks such as resetting the integral term periodically, or putting an exponential back-
off filter on the integral error in order to deal with situations which have a “badly
behaving” target. It is hard for the algorithm to predict how many devices are going
to change their status from being fixed to flippable at time tj, even if the distribution
is known at tj−1. If a large number of devices suddenly becomes flippable, then the
control probability may not adjust in time and cause overshoot, leading to unstable
behavior. Thus, if the error is already decreasing we do not want Qm to suddenly
jump down if a group of devices becomes flippable at that instant. Derivative feed-
back control addresses this concern. At any point in time, the error in tracking is
given by
∆(Q) = Qt −Qm
. Using a PID controller, the desired error correction is:
∆PID(Q) = GP ∗∆(Q) +GI
∫ t
0
∆(Q) +GD ∗ d
dt
∆(Q)
This can be converted into a local probability of change in much the same way as
before: pfeedback =
∆PID(Q)
Qf
. The expected new value after an expected set of flips
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(from time t0 to time t1 = t0 + Tf ) is thus:
E[Qm(t1)] = Qm(t0) + (2.16)
E[
∑
i∈flippable
pfeedback · di] (2.17)
= Qm(t0) + pfeedback ·Qf (t0) (2.18)
= Qm(t0) + ∆PID(Q) (2.19)
If the gains for the PID controller are stable with respect to the delay in obtaining
the aggregate state variables, then Qm may be expected to converge to Qt. Unusual
in the design of a controller, however, it is important that the control be significantly
overdamped. This is because “timed out” devices generally make the system very
slow to recover from overshoots. Thus the controller must be overdamped enough
that it approaches the target in a series of steps, adjusting the flipping probability
using the census as well as the error at every step, and where the probability of
random variance causing a significant overshoot on any step is small.
2.3.4 Adapting to a four color system
With Timed Local Probabilistic Feedback Control, we now have an algorithm that an
control power for a single PACEM “color.” All that remains is to extend it to a
multiple-color system. Note that while we discuss this algorithm in terms of the four
colors in the PACEM proposal, it generalizes trivially to a k-color algorithm.
To generalize from one to multiple colors, we introduce the concept of Range.
The Range is always a real number between 0 (black) and 3 (green), and serves as a
numerical relation between an amount of power and the total power demand, which
is pre-divided into the four colors. Let Qd = Q
3
d +Q
2
d +Q
1
d +Q
0
d denoting the division
of the total demand into the four colors, green, yellow, red, and black respectively.
Each device similarly controls four different demands di = d
3
i + d
2
i + d
1
i + d
0
i , and has
four different kinds of local power consumption mi = m
3
i +m
2
i +m
1
i +m
0
i . Note that
each mji is a discrete block of power, i.e. m
j
i ∈ {dji , 0}. The maximum i for which
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Figure 2-7: The distributed control algorithm, given the global desired and current
consumption, produces a global command for the new level. This command must
then be translated into a weighted coin-flip, to occur independently at each device,
scaled to take into account the fact that the switching-frequency limitation means
that some devices not currently controllable.
mji = d
j
i is the color c of the device, e.g. c = 2 would indicate the color “yellow.”
When a power quantity Qx has a Range of rx this means that it includes all of
the power “below” it.
Qx = (rx − brxc)×Qdrxed +
∑
i≤brxc
Qid (2.20)
brxc = maxi(Qid : Qx ≥ Qid) (2.21)
{rx} (the fractional part) = Qd −Q
brxc
d
Qddrxe (2.22)
For example, a range of 1.3 would mean that Qx contains all the power in the
“red” and “black” blocks and 30% power from the “yellow” block.
The algorithm uses two ranges: the target range rt corresponding to Qt and the
measured range rm corresponding to Qm (see Figure 2-1). With regards to control,
the fractional and integer portions are handled separately. The integer portion is
simple: when brtc changes, every device in the entire block of power changes to be
on or off (as appropriate) as soon as tfall or trise allow the device to. This portion of
control is naturally quite fast in achieving its goal.
Let us look at tracking the fractional part. There is a Q
drte
t which we need to track
using only the m
drme
i ; our integer tracking has already made sure that brtc = brmc.
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The demand is Q
drte
d and there is already some Q
drte
m which is the power consumption
within that block. We just need to use some local probabilistic control which will
push Q
drte
m toward Q
drte
t . Wait, this is exactly the problem that we solved using the
Timed Local Probabilistic Feedback Control! Instead of ∆(Q) we will introduce the
corresponding error in range,
∆(r) = (rt − brtc)− (rm − brmc)
. This can be plugged into the PID controller as before to produce a pfeedback which,
when combined with integer control to produce radjusted, the local control signal for
each device.
radjusted = brtc+
∆(r)− Q
drte
1
Q
drte
d
Q
drte
f
Q
drte
d
. This completes the feedback controller. Figure 2-8 summarizes the ColoredPower
algorithm. Each device receives aggregated data in the form of the global target, the
global demand, and the global consumption, along with a census of demand flexibility.
The device now infers the target range, measured range, and range-error using this
input. The device goes through decision-tree based on a state table (Figure 2-9)
that takes into account its local parameters: the timers, the local demand, the local
measured consumption, etc. The integer part of the range tells the device what its
minimum color should be, and the fractional part is converted into a probability with
which it should turn on the color above the minimum. Finally, each device supplies the
new local energy consumption and device state (which of the three census categories
it falls into) into the aggregator, leading to an eventual update of the global state
variables.
2.3.5 Handling User Overrides
The way that ColoredPower deals with user overrides is to simply transfer the demand
which is “overriden” to black for a period of time. For example, if a demand tuple is
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Figure 2-8: The distributed control algorithm, given the global desired and current
consumption, produces a global command for the new level.
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Figure 2-9: The state table based on the target range, measured range, and timers
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(d3, d2, d1, d0), and the user overrides a request from ColoredPower to shut off all green
power, then the new demand tuple for the user is (0, d2, d1, d3 + d0). ColoredPower
assumes that only a small fraction of users on the network will override a particular
color of power at any given time. In Chapter 4 we will look at some of the reasoning
behind this assumption.
The presented design of ColoredPower gives a promising distributed probabilistic
control solution for PACEM. It addresses in theory, most of the requirements that
were outlined at the beginning of the chapter including speed, robustness, and privacy.
The next chapter attempts to verify these claims.
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Chapter 3
Implementation and Testing of
ColoredPower
This chapter describes a series of experiments and presents the results of simulating
ColoredPower in the Proto simulator, demonstrating that ColoredPower behaves as
desired.
I implemented ColoredPower in Proto[6], a high level language where programs
are described in continous regions of space and time, rather than individual devices.
As described in earlier sections, Proto depends on the amorphous medium abstraction,
which views a network of devices as an approximation of a computational material
with a processor at every point. This continuous abstraction makes programs in Proto
highly scalable: if a program works for a neighborhood, it is almost certain to work
for an entire metropolitan area. Figure 3-1 shows an example of how the the Proto
simulator looks while running ColoredPower.
Given a working implementation of the ColoredPower algorithm, we are in a
position to verify the predicted behavior of the algorithm by analyzing results from
the Proto simulator. The simulator takes snapshots of the state of every device which
can be post-processed.
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(a) Stepping between Green and Yellow
(b) Stepping between Yellow and Red with network
links shown
Figure 3-1: A visualization of devices on the PACEM network using the Proto sim-
ulator. Each device is a disc. The color of the disc indicates the power consumption
level of the device.
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3.1 Experiment Setup
For verifying the predicted behavior of ColoredPower, we start with the simple case
of homogeneous demand across residences, with the following parameters:
• A network of n = 100 devices. These devices are distributed randomly in a
100 × 100 unit square. Each device has a communication radius of 50 units.
Thus, the expected diameter for the network is 3.
• We create a demand profile for each device, starting with a fixed tuple of
(d3, d2, d1, d0) = (3, 6, 7, 4) units of power demand in the green, yellow, red
and black blocks respectively. The total possible consumption in the system
is therefore Qd = 100 × (3 + 6 + 7 + 4) = 2000 units. This means that
(Q3d, Q
2
d, Q
1
d, Q
0
d) = (300, 600, 700, 400)
• We choose Tflip randomly in the interval of [2, 8] seconds with E[Tflip] = 5
seconds
• We choose Trise and Tfall randomly in the interval [500, 1500] seconds with the
E[Trise] = E[Tfall] = 1000 seconds
• The PID controller uses two sets of gains: {0.5, 0.08, 0.3} and {0.4, 0.1, 0.4}, the
two best performing values found via a heuristic parameter search.
• To prevent over-impact from accumulated error, integral error is given a window
of 50 seconds and an exponential backoff filter of coefficient 0.5.
• System state is sampled every 10 seconds.
3.2 Homogeneous Demand
We begin by verifying that the algorithm works correctly under homogeneous de-
mand conditions. We examine behavior using two target profiles: square wave and
sinusoidal. The square wave shows us the step response of the system and gives an
estimate of behavior in worst case conditions, e.g. if a power plant suddenly fails, or
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a major transmission network failure causes effective demand to suddenly drop. The
sinusoidal case shows the system response to smoother, incremental changes. Each
simulation is run for 10 cycles to find expected and worst case behavior.
The step response is tested using a square wave with a period of 8000 seconds,
with one experiment for steps between every possible pair of colors except black (since
consumption cannot fall below red), using the following values for Qt: 2200, 1800,
1400, and 500. Step response graphs are shown in Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-2.
To evaluate the performance of the square wave family we use the measure of con-
vergence time. This is defined as the first time after which the measured consumption
stays within 3% of the target for more than 300 seconds (a tolerance below 3% would
only allow a single device to be wrong in some situations. The overall convergence
times are shown in Table 3.2. As can be seen, fall times are generally significantly
better than rise times (due to an intentional bias in the construction of the feedback
control), but in all cases the system begins responding rapidly and is nearly complete
within 20 minutes.
We tested the incremental tracking using sine waves with periods 100 to 4000,
scaled and offset such that the peak is at 2000 (Qd) and the trough is at 400 (Q
0
d).
Each sine wave was run for 40,000 seconds to get at least 10 periods worth of response
data. Figure 3-3 shows a typical long period response: good tracking on the falling
curve and a long delay on the rising curve.
We further measure performance by the phase lag between the measured con-
sumption and the target. This phase lag is computed by minimizing the root mean
squared error (RMSE) between the measured consumption and a sine wave with the
target’s frequency and amplitude (Figure 3-4). The system tracks well with longer
periods above 2000. Below 2000, when the half-wave period is shorter than the con-
vergence time, tracking begins to break down, failing completely at high frequencies.
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(a) Between > Green and Green
(b) Between > Green and Yellow
(c) Between > Green and Red
Figure 3-2: Graphs showing the average case response to a target square wave which
switches between > Green and the colors in the demand spectrum
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(a) Between Green and Yellow
(b) Between Green and Red
(c) Between Yellow and Red
Figure 3-2: Graphs showing the average case response to a target square wave which
switches between > Green and the colors in the demand spectrum
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Color Combo High Value Low Value
>Green-Green 2200 1800
>Green-Yellow 2200 1400
>Green-Red 2200 500
Green-Yellow 1800 1400
Green-Red 1800 500
Yellow-Red 1400 500
Table 3.1: Power values for the square wave family of experiments
P,I,D Fall Convergence Time Rise Convergence Time
Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst
0.5,0.08,0.3 700 ± 530 1700 1130 ± 400 1760
0.4,0.1,0.4 920 ± 490 1640 1150 ± 390 1630
Table 3.2: Convergence Times for Homogeneous Demand
(a) Response to sine wave target with period 4000 seconds
Figure 3-3: Graph showing the response of ColoredPower to a sinusoidal target
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Figure 3-4: Lag Times vs. Period for PID gain values of 0.5, 0.08 and 0.3. The lag
times for the other PID triple look very similar.
P,I,D Fall Convergence Time Rise Convergence Time
Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst
0.5,0.08,0.3 1240 ± 300 1690 1300 ± 520 1830
0.4,0.1,0.4 1220 ± 420 1780 1300 ± 480 1780
Table 3.3: Convergence Times for Heterogeneous Demand
3.3 Heterogeneous Demand and Overriding
In the next set of experiments, we move closer to a real-world situation. Here, users
have different demand profiles and a small but variable number of users override the
system. The experiments in this situation verify that the simplifying assumptions
made while designing ColoredPower do not fail in a more general case.
To model heterogeneous demand, we change the demand profile from being fixed
at (3, 6, 7, 4), to use (d3, d2, d1, d0) such that each di is an integer chosen at random
between 0 and 10 (inclusive). Over 10 different randomly generated demand profiles,
we look at the step response using a square wave as before. The results are shown in
Figure 3-5 and Table 3.3. We find that convergence times are comparable to those of
homogeneous demand with the exception of fall mean time, which is slightly worse.
Repeating the sine wave experiment for periods over 2000, we find that the tracking
quality is analogous as well.
The way that ColoredPower deals with overrides is to simply transfer the demand
which is “overriden” to black for a period of time. For example, if a demand tuple
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P,I,D Fall Convergence Time Rise Convergence Time
Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst
0.5,0.08,0.3 1240 ± 570 2370 1310 ± 490 2250
0.4,0.1,0.4 1250 ± 580 2080 1310 ± 530 2150
Table 3.4: Convergence times for heterogeneous demand with overrides
is (d3, d2, d1, d0), and the user overrides a request from ColoredPower to shut off all
green power, then the new demand tuple for the user is (0, d2, d1, d3 + d0). We model
a small fraction of overriding by having each device make an occasional independent
decision about whether to override each color di. The likelihood of override is fixed
at 5% and the device decides on average every Toverride seconds, where Toverride is
distributed identially to Tfall and Trise. Whenever there are overrides in the system,
we can expect that the feedback system in ColoredPower will respond as soon as the
new local demand profiles are reflected in the global demand estimate. Since only a
small number of users override the system, we still expect there to be enough devices
such that the system is flexible enough to adapt even with the reduction in demand
flexibility. The results are shown in Figure 3-5 and Table 3.4. As can be seen, the
mean behavior is the same as without override, but the worst case is higher, likely
due to occasionally small perturbations.
3.4 Diameter Variance and Scalability
Finally, we verify that the algorithm is scalable by increasing both the diameter of the
network and the number of devices. For larger networks with increasing diameters, we
expect that the performance of ColoredPower will be better in terms of convergence
time and accuracy for small steps in the global target (due to higher demand flexi-
bility) but the lag time for a fast changing global target (like the sinusoidal family)
will be progressively worse.
The experimental setup uses rectangular boxes of increasing area, with a fixed
communication radius of 20. We use a fixed width x = 20 for these experiments, and
a varying length y starting at 100. The number of devices on the network is equal
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(a) Homogeneous
(b) Heterogeneous
(c) Overrides
Figure 3-5: Comparison of homogeneous demand (top) and heterogeneous demand
response. The graph showing heterogeneous demand (center) also has the different
demand values marked with the appropriate colors. The graph showing heterogeneous
demand with overrides allowed (bottom) includes the mean and std. dev. of the global
demand values.
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Figure 3-6: Lag Times vs. Period for PID gain values of 0.5, 0.08 and 0.3 for the re-
sponse to heterogeneous demand compared to the response to homogeneous demand.
Diameter Fall Convergence Time Rise Convergence Time
Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst Mean ± Std.Dev. Worst
15 450 ± 104 590 915 ± 45 1000
20 400 ± 55 450 932 ± 54 1000
25 388 ± 88 540 928 ± 38 970
50 792 ± 382 1120 910 ± 139 1130
100 1138 ± 25 1170 865 ± 45 900
Table 3.5: Convergence times for varying diameter
to y so as to maintain a dense distribution. Since x is small compared to y, we can
use an approximation of the true network diameter as the number of hops required
to cover the length y of the box (density is high enough that the stretch from indirect
travel is only a few percent[13]). Thus the diameter is
diameter = dy
r
e
As can be seen from Table 3.5, performance improves significantly for larger numbers
of devices, but falls again as lag rises. We expect that part of the degrading perfor-
mance may be due to the PID gain parameters being unable to scale to arbitrary lag.
In the long term, a more sophisticated adaptive control will be necessary.
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3.5 PID Gains
The following method was used to choose the PID gains used in the experiments
described above:
1. Run a parameter sweep across P-gains for the square wave family for a P-
controller. Choose the three best performing P-gains.
2. Run a parameter sweep across I-gains for the square wave family for a PI-
controller with P-gain from the above results. Choose the three best performing
I-gains.
3. Run a parameter sweep across D-gains for the square wave family for a PID-
controller with different PI gain combinations from the above results. Choose
the three best performing D-gains.
4. Run the resulting PID combinations on the sinusoidal family. Pick the best
performing combination.
Some notes of interest regarding these gain values. The integral gain is small
compared to the proportional and derivative gain. In a non-distributed system, one
would expect the integral gain to be higher in order to get a fast response. In this
PID controller, the more we try to lower the convergence time, the more oscillations
(although damped) we will get in the beginning of a step response. It is undesirable
to require devices to turn on or off unnecessarily, so the gains are chosen to be more
“cautious”.
This chapter verifies that the simplifying assumption of homogeneous demand in
ColoredPower is a practical one. The experiments described show that with a more
adaptive feedback control, PACEM can meet its real world design requirements.
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Chapter 4
Incentive Design
We have identified the users and the “utility” or “power company” as stakeholders in
the proposed system of PACEM. However, the “power company” is more than just
a single entity trying to make money by selling power. The electricity that powers a
household light bulb comes from a complex system of both public and private sector
industries, with multiple stakeholders who want different things. We must therefore,
identify exactly where in this economic system PACEM would fit in, and how that
part of the system can be incentivized to use PACEM. This chapter only deals with
the electric power sector in the United States.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the electric power sector and how
it relates to PACEM. The bulk of the chapter deals with the problem of designing
practical user incentives in an electricity spot market with the goal of maximizing
the surplus of the entity running the market. I will present a Colored Procurement
Mechanism which models PACEM in the domain of algorithmic mechanism design.
I do this starting with a very simple case where there are only 2 users participating
in the PACEM network with 2 possible preferences, and then try to generalize this
scenario for application in a real world PACEM.
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4.1 The Electric Power Sector
The electric power sector is very time sensitive due to the technology that is used
for power distribution. Electric power grids are dynamic in the sense that electricity
must be supplied exactly when it needs to be consumed. At every point in time, the
power grid has to ensure a balance between the demand and supply of power on the
network. The failure of a single component of the power grid can have devastating
consequences; thus there must be many safeguards in the operation, planning, and
policy surrounding the electric power sector.
From the time electricity is generated at a power plant to when it powers a light
bulb in a household, it must interact with separate entities that perform the following
functions[4]. The relationship between these entities is shown in Figure 4-1.
1. Generation
The electricity that goes into the power grid comes from a multitude of different
power generators, whether they are wind, solar, thermal, nuclear or hydro.
These generation plants are operated by public or private institutions for profit.
2. Transmission
The high-voltage transmission grid is a type of wholesale market for electricity,
which connects generator facilities to cities or other areas of high energy con-
sumption. Transmission is run by an entity separate from the generator and
the distributor, and is either in the public sector or a regulated private sector.
3. Distribution
This low-voltage grid delivers electricity from the transmission grid to the end
users. Distribution involves the equivalent of a retail market for electricity; the
distributor is the “utility” that retail consumers interact with.
4. Regulation
There is a regulatory authority (generally government-controlled and central-
ized) which enforces high level power grid decisions like the total capacity of the
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grid, the coupling (and de-coupling) of the different parts of the power sector,
etc.
5. Consumption
For our purposes, the end user is a house owner consuming between 1 and 5
KW of electricity in a residential neighborhood in an urban area. In PACEM,
it is important how a user’s consumption compares to the overall load on the
grid, and how it compares to other user’s consumption.
6. Protection and Control
These are safety nets in the form of control systems at various points in the
electricity supply chain. They are analogous to a “fuse” which is blown when-
ever something goes wrong to protect an electrical device. They are not very
relevant to the discussion of PACEM incentives, however, they will raise impor-
tant integration and compatibility issues if PACEM is to be deployed on a large
scale.
4.2 Power Sector Incentives
Most of the real time operating functions in the power system described above are
based on safety rather than economic motivations. With newer pricing models and
technologies, real time electricity pricing has become a reality in some places using
smart grids as evidenced by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Assessment
of Demand Response and Advanced Metering[20]. However, this pricing still can only
motivate the choices of individual consumers and not necessarily the operations of
electricity distribution.
The basic regulatory rules prohibit any single entity from participating in a mo-
nopolistic/regulated activity (like constructing the physical distribution lines) and a
competitive activity (like generating energy or selling retail energy) at the same time.
The distributing activity is regulated so that it is obligated to supply in the area of its
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Figure 4-1: Components of a Power System from “Electric Energy Systems: Analysis
and Operation”[4]
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Figure 4-2: Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This figure
shows how a utility can achieve peak reduction in the power load via demand reduc-
tion.
jurisdiction[4]. Figure 4-2 shows in concept the regulated, “non-discretionary” power
supply vs. the additional discretionary supply that a utility normally provides.
There are many decisions to be made on a relatively small time scale regarding
protection, generation control, economic dispatch, and unit commitment in this sys-
tem (Figure 2-2 describes this timescale). PACEM aims to operate on a time scale
which will enable very fast decision making and dispatch of these functions.
Since the retail electric utility buys electricity at a wholesale price from a spot
market, the electric utility may not have any immediate monetary incentive to use
PACEM. Figure 4-3 gives us an idea of the incentives that utilities may have to im-
plement a demand response program like PACEM. As can be seen, the non-monetary
benefits of PACEM are much lower in priority.
The regulatory body’s job is to maximize the social utility by making provision
that protect consumers and investors in the electricity market. It is in this body’s
interest in today’s energy hungry world to reduce demand, and so this body has incen-
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Figure 4-3: This graph describes the results of a survey conducted by a company
called UtiliPoint[19]. Each bar represents the primary incentive for implementing a
demand reduction program as reported by the utilities included in the survey.
tive to support the implementation of PACEM. Currently, a lot of supply-generation
facilities are required to keep generators on reserve to account for sudden rises in elec-
tricity demand. The installation and maintenance of these extra generation units is
not profitable. PACEM offers a solution to deal with sudden spikes in demand with-
out requiring the additional safety generation unit. The disadvantage of depending
on the regulatory body to provide incentives is that it may be very slow and interacts
strongly with the external political environment.
PACEM, and ColoredPower in particular, can easily integrate with any pricing
model which relies on non-specific information about electricity demand. For instance,
customers can use either variable-market-priced or linearly-priced electricity even
though they may be on the same PACEM. This is possible because ColoredPower
makes no assumptions about the price of electricity at any given device; each device
uses the relation between demand and supply (which does not depend on price) to
make decisions. It would be easy to add a layer of decisionmaking in each device that
is dependent on the relationship of that device with the electricity distributor(s), but
independent of other individual devices’ decisions.
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Figure 4-4: Figure from Factsheet 2 of the New England Power Generator’s
Association[15]. The figure shows an example of the relation between market trans-
actions and power transactions in New England. The ISO is the Independent System
Operator.
4.2.1 Electricity Spot Markets
Even with many safeguards and regulations in place, the demand and supply of
electricity often do not meet. A spot market for electricity pricing exists for these
situations[15]. An attempt is made to achieve market clearing i.e. total demand
meets total supply. An example of the relation between the spot market and the actual
power distribution is shown in Figure 4-4. In a spot market, generators submit offers,
and the authority (generally the Independent System Operator (ISO)) chooses which
and how many generators to schedule depending on the demand from consumers. For
the purposes of modeling mechanism design, we assume that it is possible for the
generator to be the direct provider and negotiator of energy with the end users in
such a spot market. We can assume this since the suppliers of electricity (generators,
wholesalers, and retailers) can negotiate using their offers, and the ISO is generally
non-profit.
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4.3 Introduction to Consumer Incentives and Mech-
anism Design
The primary incentive for a user opting into PACEM is a monetary kickback from
the energy savings in the system. EnerNOC has already proven that some types
of consumers are willing to participate in demand-response programs in order to
save energy and money. Also, consumers want more hard data about their energy
usage and in the long term, and we might design a way to provide them with usage
statistics in greater detail through PACEM. Some consumers may be willing to pay
higher prices to maintain the convenience of electricity; if this group of consumers is
large enough, the utility may not be able to provide a sufficient monetary incentive.
In this case, we could try and negotiate with the regulatory authority in the public
sector to subsidize the monetary incentives in the interest of social welfare.
For the rest of this chapter, we will assume that PACEM is able to provide mon-
etary incentives comparable to consumers’ value of electricity. Under this condition,
we assume that every user is trying to maximize his/her own monetary savings from
participating in PACEM. Further, we only look at cases of reducing demand i.e. where
the power generated is insufficient to meet consumer demand. We will not look at
situations where the power generated is greater than the consumer demand.
4.3.1 Mechanism Design Terminology
• Incentive Compatibility: In PACEM, users report their preferences which are
aggregated and sent to the utility. We would like to design a system where
users are motivated to report their preferences honestly. This is to say that
when we design an incentive system for the users of PACEM, a user should
not be able to “game the system” by misreporting her preferences to achieve a
higher payoff than what she would get if she was honest. Such mechanisms are
called incentive compatible or truthful mechanisms.
• Individually Rational: Under the assumption that all users are rational, no user
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should ever get a negative payoff or penalty for participating in PACEM. If a
user has nothing to lose by participating in a mechanism, i.e. her utility is
always ≥ 0, then the mechanism is called individually rational.
• NPT: Many scenarios in mechanism design assume No Positive Transfers, which
means that if a user does not come out ahead in the game, then she gets no
benefit. Particularly, if a user does not “win” in an auction or other resource
allocation game, her utility is 0. We will assume NPT for our design. How-
ever, this may not be true if there is a significant payment to users for just
participating in PACEM, which does not depend on their demand reduction.
• Envy-free: An auction is envy-free if after the auction is run, no bidder would
be happier with someone else’s outcome. We would like PACEM to be envy-
free, because this is a key to users perceiving PACEM as a “fair” system. We
will not investigate envy-free-ness here, but note that PACEM is promising in
this regard since the design of ColoredPower is expected to produce the same
results for two identical users when averaged over time.
• Collusion-resistant: We would like PACEM to be collusion-resistant, i.e. no
user can obtain a higher profit by collaborating with other users.
• Competitive-ratio: We define the competitive-ratio as the factor by which the
auctioneer has to pay extra by running a real time mechanism, as opposed
to the optimal solution when the auctioneer knows all information about the
user/bidder. Here, the “optimal fixed pricing solution” is defined as the incen-
tive distribution that maximizes the utility’s profit if the utility knows all the
information about every individual device.
• Constant-competitive: In order to encourage the power sector to adopt PACEM,
we would like a mechanism that will guarantee a certain profit, which is a
constant factor of the optimal fixed pricing solution (and does not depend on
other situational variables). In other words, this is a mechanism which has a
constant competetive ratio.
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• Auctioneer: In this case, this is the electricity supplier/generator. In context of
the power sector, this is the authority that runs the spot market for electricity
whenever power generation does not meet consumer demand. The auctioneer
in this case is always trying to either maximize his profit by selling something
to the network of users or trying to be as frugal as possible when buying goods
from the network of users.
• Profit/Surplus Maximizing: An auction is said to be a profit maximizing if
it achieves the maximum possible profit/surplus for the auctioneer under the
initial conditions of the auction.
Normally, when the devices in a residence are on PACEM, the user is implicitly
participating in the economic mechanism that goes along with it. We grant the user
the ability to choose whether she wants to override the system during every decision
cycle in PACEM. In an individually rational mechanism, the user would never override
the system unless he/she values the use of a device more than the incentive payment
offered for shutting it off. There will be times when this will happen e.g. during the
Super Bowl, a lot of users may override their television sets. For this analysis, we
assume that mass-overrides are infrequent.
Now let us put some of the quantities from ColoredPower in context. Recall
that the three important aggregate quantities in the system are Qt, the availability
of power, Qd, the demand for power, and Qm, the measured power consumption.
The goal is for Qm to match Qt as closely as possible. From the user point of view,
Qd is split into green, yellow, red, and black. We generalize that Qd =
∑kQkd for
a k-colored system. User i has demand dki for k-colored energy. There is some set
of valuation functions V which distinguishes between the values that a user has for
different kinds of energy. Consistent with the coloring system, the valuation function
vi ∈ V for user i satisfies vk−1i ≥ vk−2i . . . v1i . The auctioneer’s constraint is a monetary
budget, B. In any mechanism, the auctioneer would like to retain as much of B as
possible while meeting some goals.
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4.3.2 Application of the Digital Goods Auction
There are many mechanisms already designed which deal with resource-allocation
situations. The most relevant one is the digital goods auction[11]. However, this
mechanism is not the best model for PACEM. To see why, let us try to apply this
mechanism in the relatively simple case of homogeneous demand under the following
assumptions:
• dki = {0, 1}∀i, k
• None of the players have prior-information about the other players’ values or
bids.
• Use a “money is the good, demand reduction is the payment” model.
The digital goods auction decision problem asks whether any solution exists to this
allocation problem. This is followed by the application of ProfitExtractR, an
algorithm from [11]. ProfitExtractR as defined for this problem has a target
profit R and sells to the largest group of n bidders that can equally share R and
charges R/n to each seller in this group. Here the target profit is R = Qd −Qt, and
each user who contributes to this profit must pay Qd−Qt
n
where n is the total number
of contributors to demand reduction. ProfitExtractR is known to be truthful
and provide a profit of R provided that the total value held by the users is at least
equal to R. Since the auctioneer is looking for a profit of exactly R = Qd − Qt,
we do not have to do any further optimizations to maximize R (unlike the digital
goods auction). ProfitExtractR can be modified to work for non-homogeneous
users as well. However, this is only under the condition there exists a solution to the
underlying optimization problem which is to construct a bundle of goods which is
exactly equal to R. In the case that there is no group of bidders such that the total
demand reduction adds up to R = Qd − Qt, then the auctioneer can simply choose
the highest Qt∗ < Qt where a group does exist. One problem with this approach is
that a group of bidders may have a monopoly if it is the only group which satisfies
the optimization problem.
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While this method looks appealing, it does not let us account for the idea of the
“discretized bidding” by the users which is caused by the system of colors. Further,
this method is also based on the idea that none of the players in the game have any
information at all about the other players. A better approach may be to look at
this system as a Bayesian optimization mechanism problem, i.e. a mechanism design
which assumes some information about the probabilistic distributions of the private
information held by different players, and which also takes into account the discretized
bidding due to the color system. In the following sections we will try to accomplish
the following:
• Describe a practical economic model for the cooperative energy management
system and identify the requirements.
• Design a mechanism which will address all the stakeholders’ goals and the re-
quirements of the model.
• Analyze the mechanism and propose further work to improve upon it.
4.4 Cooperative Energy Management Model
We look at the capacity to produce demand reduction as the capacity to produce a
certain quantity of goods. The cost of producing the goods is the same as the cost of
not using a particular device. So we have a market where there is a single buyer (the
power company) and a number of sellers (the devices). For our model, we will assume
that each device consumes the same amount of power; we normalize this to be exactly
1 indivisible unit. This is a reasonable approximation since PACEM will be operating
on a very large number of devices where each device consumes a very small amount of
electricity compared to the total reduction required. PACEM requires all the devices
in the same color preference in a single home to have the same state, which is not the
case in this model; however it would be easy to add this constraint once we devise
a good incentive system. Thus, every device has the capacity to produce 1 unit of
the good at some cost (which is different for each device). We normalize the cost per
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Figure 4-5: Value of a seller’s good for color ci+1
good to be in [0, 1]. However, each device can only be set to one of a finite number of
colors, k. The important thing to note is that for any cost v of a device, there exist
unique colors ci and ci+1 such that ci < v ≤ ci+1 and in this case, the “truthful” bid
for the device is ci+1. We say that ci+1 is the truthful bid because it is the lowest bid
which is individually rational, i.e. the lowest bid that will earn a non-negative profit.
The buyer, ideally, should not have to pay any more than this lowest bid.
The goal of the buyer is to purchase q = Qt−Qd goods at a minimum price. Thus,
it does not matter to the buyer if a device bids lower than its truthful bid. This is
because if a device sells something for less than its value, that is a better deal than
the buyer expects to have. So, we will not worry about underbidding in this model.
We normalize the color system such that every ci falls between 0 and ck = 1.
Thus, we can describe our desired mechanism, M , to operate in the following
manner:
Definition 1. A Colored Procurement Mechanism M takes the following inputs
1. B, the total budget of the buyer
2. n, the total number of sellers/goods
3. q ∈ 0, . . . , n, the total number of goods that the buyer wishes to purchase
4. b(i) ∈ K : K ⊂ [0, 1], |K| = k, the bids of sellers i ∈ [n]. Every bid b(i) must be
equal to one of c1, . . . , ck
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and outputs p(c), the payments offered by the buyer to sellers who bid c ∈ K
Thus, the buyer’s surplus is B −∑i p(i). We would like to design a mechanism
which maximizes the buyer’s surplus while being individually rational. Unfortunately,
it has been shown that it is impossible to design a mechanism which is incentive
compatible, profit maximizing, and collusion-resistant all at the same time[10]. We
will stick to the first two and then try to get as close to collusion resistance as possible.
4.5 2 Color Systems
If k = 1 the system reduces to the trivial case where there is only one bid allowed for
the sellers. So we start by looking at a system with k = 2. This means that there is
essentially a partition in the value-space [0, 1] at some value c where the “truthful”
bid for all sellers below c is c and all sellers above c is 1. Similar to ColoredPower,
ties in bids from sellers are broken via coin flip.
4.5.1 2 Color with 2 Sellers
We start with the simple case with just 2 sellers, assuming that the buyer wants to
purchase 1 unit. So n = 2 and q = 1. We also assume that the buyer’s budget B = 1,
i.e. the buyer will always have a non-negative surplus. The buyer collects the bids
from the players and offers one of them a payment in exchange for their good. The
buyer wants to structure the payment to ensure that the sellers are truthful in their
bids. For now we assume that there is no collusion.
It is easy to see that in the cases where both sellers’ values fall into the same
partition the buyer can trivially enforce truthfulness. In the case where both sellers
have values higher than c only the truthful bid gives them non-negative profits, and
if they are both lower than c then deviating from the truthful bid gives them 0 profit.
Suppose seller 1 has value v1 ≤ c and seller 2 has value v2 > c and they both report
truthfully. The buyer buys from seller 1 since it is the highest surplus. Then seller 2
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Figure 4-6: Two color, 2 seller game
makes no profit, while the profit for seller 1 is
Πtruthful1 = p(c)− v1
where p(c) ≥ v1 is the payment offered by the buyer to seller 1. The only possible
deviation for seller 1 is to misreport his value as > c, i.e. 1. If seller 1 misreports, he
is not guaranteed to sell since he will be tied with seller 2 and the tie will be broken
with a coin flip by the buyer. The expected profit for seller 1 is thus
E[Πmisreport1 ] =
1
2
(p(1)− v1)
The incentive compatibility condition says that:
Πtruthful1 ≥ E[Πmisreport1 ] (4.1)
p(c)− v1 ≥ 1
2
(p(1)− v1) (4.2)
p(c) ≥ p(1)
2
+
v1
2
(4.3)
Since B = 1, p(1) = 1 in order to preserve individual rationality. Thus, in order to
get seller 1 to be truthful, the buyer must pay at least the RHS value in the above
inequality. Since the buyer does not know anything about seller 1 except for v1 ≤ c,
67
Figure 4-7: Two Color, n seller game
we get a lower bound for the payment which is
pmin(c) =
1
2
+
c
2
Note that pmin(c) > c for 0 < c < 1.
4.5.2 2 Color with n Sellers
The more general 2 color case is one with n sellers where the buyer wishes to purchase
q units. Assume that s1 sellers have values less than c while s2 sellers have value
greater than c such that s1 + s2 = n. Suppose everyone bids truthfully. The s2 group
does not have any incentive to deviate from their truthful bid, since 1 is the only bid
that gives them non-negative returns. If q < s1, none of the sellers from that group
will deviate since deviating will give them a profit of 0 (because the buyer will not
need to buy any goods from the s2 group). q ≥ s1 gives a situation similar to the one
above, where the s1 sellers in the left partition have a guaranteed sell, while the s2
sellers in the right partition have a probabilistic one. In this case, for a seller in the
left partition with value v1 and a seller in the right with v2 we have
Πtruthful1 = p(c)− v1 (4.4)
Πtruthful2 = (p(1)− v2)
q − s1
s2
(4.5)
Πmisreport1 = (p(1)− v1)
q − s1 + 1
s2 + 1
(4.6)
Πmisreport2 ≤ 0 (4.7)
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Thus our only incentive compatibility condition is
Πtruthful1 ≥ Πmisreport1 (4.8)
p(c)− v ≥ (p(1)− v)q − s1 + 1
s2 + 1
(4.9)
p(c) ≥ v + (p(1)− v)q − s1 + 1
s2 + 1
(4.10)
pmin(c) = c+ (p(1)− c)1 + q − s1
1 + s2
(4.11)
assuming that p(1) = 1 and max(v) = c.
The second term in the equation describing pmin(c) gives us the cost of truthful-
ness, i.e. if the buyer knew every individual seller’s actual value, then he could get
away with paying c to all of the sellers whose values are less than c, regardless of their
bids. By agreeing to pay the extra factor, the buyer ensures that every seller’s best
response is to bid truthfully. Note that this extra factor is always non-negative for
q > s1.
The cost of truthfulness as described above is strongly dependent on how s1 and
s2 relate to q. If s2 is very large compared to q− s1, then the cost of truthfulness will
be very low. On the other hand, if s1 +s2 is only slightly greater than q, then the cost
of truthfulness is very high. In the limit case where s1 + s2 = n = q, the buyer must
buy from every single seller at the highest price. Indeed, substituting q − s1 = s2 in
the expression for pmin(c) gives us
pmin(c) = c+ (p(1)− c)1 + q − s1
1 + s2
(4.12)
= c+ (p(1)− c)1 + s2
1 + s2
(4.13)
= c+ (p(1)− c) (4.14)
= p(1) (4.15)
The above arguments show that in order for the buyer to compute pmin(c) apriori,
he must know s1 and s2. This may not be practical in a real setting, which poses
a problem. A more reasonable approach is for the buyer to have some information
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Figure 4-8: k colors, n sellers
about the distribution of the seller’s values in [0,1]. The buyer can then estimate
E[s1] = n × Pr(v ≤ c) and E[s2] = n × Pr(c < v ≤ 1). Then the term 1+q−s11+s2 is
replaced by E[1+q−s1
1+s2
] to achieve truthfulness in expectation.
4.6 k Color Systems
In order to extend our 2 color system, we use the following claim
Claim 1. If
∑
j≤i sj < q <
∑
j≤i+1 sj, then
pmin(ci) = ci + (p(ci+1)− ci)
1 + q −∑j≤i sj
1 + si+1
The condition on q means that deviating more than one color above the true bid
will give the seller at most 0 profit. In PACEM terms, if the demand reduction q is
satisfied by devices set to green and yellow, then a device changing its bid from green
to red will not turn off and get 0 incentive payment. On the other hand, bidding
truthfully will give the seller p(ci)−v. Thus the only deviation is one color up, which
reduces to the 2 color scenario. Replacing s1 and s2 with the appropriate indices
and cumulative quantities gives us the claim. This claim gives the buyer a payment
system to ensure truthfulness of sellers in color ci or higher.
The problem at hand now is how to incentivize the sellers from c1 to ci−1 to be
truthful. If
∑
j≤i sj < q then those sellers will receive the highest profit from bidding
ci, although their truthful bid might be much lower. I claim that in this situation, the
buyer must pay each seller with value ≤ ci−1 the same amount as the sellers bidding
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ci, otherwise all of those sellers will have incentive to deviate to bidding ci.
4.7 Analysis and Implementation
We have seen that the cost for truthfulness is (p(ci+1)− ci)1+q−
∑
j≤i sj
1+si+1
. In the optimal
deterministic situation where the buyer knows every seller’s true value, this cost is
0. The overpayment of the buyer can be characterized as argmaxi(
pmin(ci)
ci
), i.e. this
the maximum factor by which the buyer has to overpay compared to a complete-
information system in order to maximize his surplus. In the k color system, we have
that pmin(cj<i) = pmin(ci) so this will depend on the distribution of the ci’s.
For the 2 color system, assuming that p(1) = 1 we have a competitive ratio of
R =
pmin(c)
c
(4.16)
= 1 +
(1− c)
c
1 + q − s1
1 + s2
(4.17)
≤ 1 + 1− c
c
=
1
c
(4.18)
This is because 1+q−s1
1+s2
is upper bounded by 1. Depending on the value of c, this ratio
can be made arbitrarily large. This shows that the value of c is very important to
how well the mechanism will perform. In the limit case where c = 1, we observe that
the ratio is 1, since the only allowed bid and payment is 1. The competitive ratio can
never be more than 1, since the cost of truthfulness will always be positive. Since the
buyer wants to maximize surplus, he wants to minimize the competitive ratio while
preserving the other requirements of the system.
Now let us consider what happens if prior to designing the mechanism the buyer
has the power to choose k and the value of every ci. At this point in time the buyer
knows only the distributions of the sellers’ values v and the distribution for q. We
look at the special case relating to cooperative energy management where k = 3
(actually there are 4 settings for the devices, but the “black” setting is equivalent
to non-participation in the mechanism). Assuming a Gaussian distribution for q,
we want q to be somewhere between two well chosen values of c1 and c2 with high
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Figure 4-9: Choosing ci in a 3 color system
probability, such that the incentive payment pmin(c1) occurs with high probability.
The smaller the difference between c1 and c2, the smaller the cost of truthfulness,
but the lower the probability of q actually falling between them. We need a way to
minimize the expected cost of truthfulness in this scenario. I will not address this
problem here, but suggest a starting point for this line of analysis.
The particular assignment described in Figure 4-9 is given by
c1 = E[
q
n
]− σ( q
n
) (4.19)
c2 = E[
q
n
] + σ(
q
n
) (4.20)
This assignment means that q will fall between c1 and c2 with high probability. Al-
though this may not result in the minimum expected cost of truthfulness, the pre-
dictability of the cost of truthfulness will be a benefit to the utility.
Now that we have looked at the economics behind incentivization, we can try
to give a tangible way of incentivizing PACEM. We set the following requirements
in order for the incentives to be practical from the perspective of real-world user
expectations:
1. There should be incentive for a user to participate as long as his/her flexibility
is non-zero
2. The incentive should reflect the total demand reduction provided by a user
72
3. There should never be any penalties to the user
An individually rational mechanism would address 3, while the colored procure-
ment mechanism will address 2. To address 1, we might add some small incentive
for user participation, although this violates the NPT condition. This should not
depend on what color or amount the demand flexibility is, since this would require
designing another mechanism which deals with truthfulness of users when they “opt
in” to PACEM. Such a mechanism would follow many of the arguments given for
the procurement mechanism, but would make the opt-in process unnecessarily com-
plicated, which is undesirable. Further, if the participation incentive is substantial,
users may opt in to the system and set it to always override. Thus the initial in-
centive can come in the form of a free installation of the smart outlets required for
participation in PACEM.
Users have the opportunity to optimize their preferences for maximum demand
reduction once they participate in PACEM, and the payoff from demand reduction
is designed to be much higher than that of “opting in” in order to encourage users
to commit flexibility first and preferences later. A user setting their preferences is
analogous to placing bids during the procurement scenario. Another factor which can
be incorporated in this model is dynamic energy pricing[9, 16], that would encourage
users to provide more flexibility during peak hours and less flexibility during low-load
hours.
In this chapter, we have made progress in designing a user incentive system for
PACEM in the form of Colored Procurement Mechanisms. This class of mecha-
nisms is useful since it allows for integration with randomized algorithms such as
ColoredPower and provides a concrete way to quantify the cost of enforcing truth-
fulness in user preference reporting. The next step is to solve the optimization of the
cost of truthfulness.
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Chapter 5
Contributions and Future Work
This thesis takes a significant technological step forward in making demand side coop-
erative energy management a possibility for small-scale energy users. The ColoredPower
algorithm along with the incentive structure forms a system that is highly scalable for
large networks in metropolitan areas. This system helps PACEM achieve its design
goals of demand flexibility, dynamic response to changing demand and availability of
power, and non-intrusiveness and privacy for the end user, all while being easy and
cheap to install.
The ColoredPower algorithm is a probabilistic distributed algorithm that runs
simultaneously on a large number of devices in order to accurately control the aggre-
gate power consumed by devices that are “on” to a target value in a non-intrusive
way by ensuring that any single device does not turn on or off rapidly. This is a
contribution to the field of randomized distributed control that allows for changing
local and global conditions, unavailability of parts of the network for long periods
of time and provides a control system to make randomized local actions turn into
accurate global behavior. Although ColoredPower is only described in terms of a 4
color system, it is easy to see that it is applicable to a k-color system as well.
The ColoredPower algorithm is not limited to PACEM in its application. The
ideas behind ColoredPower can describe decentralized algorithms that run on every
individual component of a distributed system in order to control an aggregate prop-
erty of the system, while allowing for changing availability of the components in the
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Figure 5-1: A simple traffic routing problem
system. For instance, it may be possible to adapt and expand ColoredPower for other
distributed resource and task allocation scenarios, such as bandwidth allocation on
networks or vehicle traffic routing. Consider the traffic routing problem as shown in
Figure 5-1, where there are n vehicles trying to get from a source to a destination.
There are two available highways, A and B, with some crossroads connecting them.
Vehicles can only decide to switch between highways if they are near a crossroad.
Once they switch from one highway to another, they cannot switch back until they
get to the next crossroad. The vehicles are equipped with short-range radios that
periodically give them estimates about the total number of vehicles on A and B. The
problem is to route traffic in real time so that neither highway is too congested, with
the constraint that no single vehicle should have to switch highways significantly more
times than other vehicles, since the added travel distance is inconvenient. One can
imagine a ColoredPower type algorithm operating in each vehicle which decides with
some probability whether to switch highways.
The incentive structure that I have proposed ensures that users will not try to game
the system under certain conditions. Algorithmic mechanism design is a relatively
new field at the junction of economics and computer science, and it is important for
the theoretical results to be applied in practical scenarios such as the one described
by PACEM. Large scale demand response exists because it is more profitable and
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easy to implement with a very small number of users. A good incentive structure will
enable participation by a large number of small scale users. If implemented correctly,
small scale demand response can be just as, if not more profitable for the electric
power sector and for the users.
Lastly, PACEM is a system conceived with the goals of saving energy, being
environmentally conscious, and working toward a more efficient society. This thesis
contributes to all of these efforts.
5.1 Future Work
The algorithm we describe has a few limitations that should be addressed in future
work. For instance, the PID gains that are used in the experiments are not suitable
for every type of network. In fact, I suspect that the optimal values for these gains
depend on the network diameter. It would be possible to design an improved version
of ColoredPower using dynamic PID gains that depend on factors like the network
diameter, the census of the system, and the absolute value of the target Qt. Further,
it is unclear that a PID controller is the best feedback controller for the job. Further
work should investigate other types of tracking controllers, which may achieve better
results.
There is much work in the area of mechanism design in the context of distributed
probabilistic control that can be done. For instance, designing a collusion resistant
online mechanism would have the potential to benefit PACEM. In the current network
topology, no user knows specific information about users other than her neighbors. I
predict that this mechanism will likely be resistant to collusion by very small fraction
of users on the network. Future work includes quantifying exactly how collusion
resistant the Colored Procurement Mechanism can be, and what improvements can
be made in this area. In a real world setting, users may use non-PACEM networks
(e.g. the Internet) to exchange information and increase their profits. The mechanism
could then be manipulated by large groups of users whose total pool of demand
flexibility is comparable to the total demand reduction needed; it is doubtful that
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we can design a system which will be resistant to collusion among arbitrarily large
groups of users.
Finally, the next biggest step toward the realization of PACEM is to use prototype
devices to verify that the algorithm and incentive structure (perhaps with some of the
above mentioned improvements) can work on a real system. This will set the stage
for deploying PACEM for actual consumers.
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